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David R. Francis presented himself as the “United States Ambassador to 
Russia under the Czar, the Provisional Government and the Bolshevists.” Actually 
he represented his country before four Russian Governments: the Imperial, 
Provisional, Soviet, and Northern ones. During his stay in Russia Francis changed 
the place of his residence three times moving from Petrograd first to Vologda 
and finally to Archangel. He was an eyewitness of the greatest events in history 
of Russia: the First World War, February Revolution, downfall of the Empire, 
October Revolution, and Civil War. During two and half years of his residence in 
Russia, Francis met a lot of prominent people of the time, including Nicholas II, 
the last Emperor of Russia, and Vladimir I. Lenin, the first Soviet leader. Francis’ 
diplomatic experience was unique and had no parallel in the history of Russian-
American relations. That is why his memoirs are of special interest for historians 
and general public as well.
The most striking feature of his Russian experience is the fact that Francis was 
not a diplomat at all. Practically nothing in his previous life might help him in his 
ambassadorial work. David Rowland Francis was born in Richmond, Kentucky, in 
1850, and removed to St. Louis, Missouri, in 1866 to enter Washington University. 
After graduation he became a clerk and soon afterwards partner in a commercial 
house, thus beginning his successful business career. Francis was also an officer 
or trustee in many banking and philanthropic institutions. At that same time he 
rose to prominence in politics, serving as mayor of St. Louis (1885–1889) and 
the youngest governor of Missouri (1889–1893). For a short time Francis served 
Secretary of Interior in President Grover Cleveland’s cabinet. He was a devoted 
Democrat but opposed William J. Bryan’s candidacy in 1896 and afterwards was 
out of politics for ten years. Francis married Jane Perry, belonging to a prominent 
Missouri family, and they had six sons.
One of Francis’ most brilliant achievements was his campaign to organize 
the 1904 World Exposition at St. Louis. From one side, it was a typical story 
illustrating his unusual business and administrative abilities. From another, the 
episode was of special importance in Francis’ biography because it provided him 
with the only international experience prior to his appointment to a diplomatic 
post. This wonderful saga begun in the summer of 1889 when Francis began 
pushing for a world’s fair to be held in St. Louis and lasted for fifteen years. 
In 1903 Francis made a tour around principal European capitals to encourage 
foreign participation. He met King Edward VII of Great Britain, French president 
Emile Loubet, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, and King Leopold II of Belgium. 
From Europe Francis hastened back to St. Louis, where on the Dedication Day 
Ceremony he welcomed members of the diplomatic corps including British, 
French, Italian, and Russian ambassadors. The St. Louis Fair lasted for seven 
months during which Francis was said to be “the most photographed man in 
America.”1 The fair was the largest international exposition the world ever seen 
by the moment and it was a great financial success.2 In mid-1906, Francis, with his 
companions, made another trip to Europe where he “was tireless in tracking down 
monarchs and prime ministers” wherever they might be found.3
At the same time Francis returned to active political life and came around to 
support Woodrow Wilson in 1912. Francis also strengthened his friendship with 
Charles R. Crane, a wealthy Chicago businessman and prominent Democratic 
campaign contributor, who was a friend of the new president. Crane had reputation 
of one of the most active and influential promoter of the rapprochement with 
Russia. The so-called Crane circle included, among others, such diverse people as 
journalists Arthur Ruhl and Stanley Washburn, businessmen Frederick M. Corse 
and Raymond Robins, and the YMCA leader John R. Mott,—to list only those 
persons whom, as well as Crane himself, Francis would meet later in Petrograd. 
The most outstanding figure among Crane’s followers was an expert in Russian 
language and institutions Samuel N. Harper. 
On the eve of the First World War the post of the US Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg was vacant and interrelations between two powers were rather cool. 
In July 1914, the ambassadorship to Russia was offered to an international lawyer 
and active Democratic supporter George T. Marye but in the early 1916 he was 
forced to resign as a result of his inability to meet Wilson’s hopes. With Crane’s 
assistance a new ambassador in the person of Governor Francis was appointed 
and Harper was named an unofficial advisor to accompany him to Russia.4 As 
his biographer wrote, in his mature years Francis represented “the perfect image 
of a successful American businessman and civic leader” and was “proud of his 
contributions to the community, pleased with his accomplishments and with 
himself.” He was “a brash, opinionated, stubborn, smart, sometimes foolish, 
straight-talking, quick-acted, independent-minded, proud, self-made man.” 
Francis “was rich and getting richer, busy with his directorships and his civic 
duties, regularly travelling the country to speak to large audiences and meet with 
other powerful men, who were his friends.”5
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In the meantime, as the editor of his letters noted, “Francis was shrewd and 
capable in the world he knew, but international diplomacy was not in that world.”6 
The Russian ambassador in Washington characterized him as a thriving provincial 
businessman with a good fortune and great self-assurance.7 The new American 
ambassador had but a little international experience, no theoretical preparation, 
no practical knowledge, no diplomatic abilities required for the post. In George F. 
Kennan’s opinion, “Francis was not what you would call a cosmopolitan person. 
He was a product of the old West, a ‘provincial’ in the best sense of the term, 
in whose character there was reflected something of the ‘showboat’ Mississippi: 
the vigor, the earthiness, the slightly flamboyant elegance, and the uninhibited 
enjoyment of the good things of life. His values and opinions were, at his age of 67, 
firmly established, and were not to be essentially shaken even by the experience 
of residence in a foreign capital in dramatic times.”8 He was made a diplomat by 
chance as a consequence of a “Democratic débauche” in the Foreign Service and 
demoralization of the State Department that followed Woodrow Wilson’s rise to 
presidency. 
Francis sailed for Russia on April 8, 1916, leaving his family at home. He 
was accompanied by his African-American valet Philip Jordan. Arthur Ruhl, who 
crossed the Atlantic on the same steamboat, remembered that “his man Friday, 
Phil, a body-servant of the old-fashioned Southern kind, already mourning, after 
but a week of foreign ways, for the hot biscuits of St. Louis.”9 Harper, another 
Francis’ companion, wrote after several days of cruise: “I heard enough of them 
to realize that our new ambassador was a very blunt, outspoken American, who 
believed in speaking his mind regardless of the rules of diplomacy.”10
Francis arrived at Petrograd in the morning on April 15 (28) and was met at 
the station by the embassy people. Staff of the US embassy in the Russian capital 
at the moment consists of nine men. The senior diplomat was a veteran Herbert 
H.D. Pierce, a Special Agent of the State Department with the rank of Minister 
Plenipotentiary, appointed in 1915 to assist the ambassador in Russia. Long 
before this appointment he served in Russia for seven years and his prolonged 
experience taught him that the “entire social fabric of Russia, the point of view of 
the Russian mind and its manner of thought, differ widely from our own, and are 
not susceptible of estimation upon the same basis of comparison.”11 Francis had 
not enough time to know this lesson because his cooperation with the experienced 
adviser was very short. The next in rank was first secretary of the embassy Fred M. 
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Dearing, Francis’ fellow-countryman but his antipode in the realm of diplomacy. 
Another Missourian, Frederick A. Sterling, and John C. White held the posts of 
second secretary, and John L. Ryan was third secretary. 
The staff of attachés to the embassy included a brilliant naval officer Newton 
A. McCully who was appointed the first permanent US naval attaché with 
residence in Petrograd and played a prominent part in Russian-American relations 
during the First World War, the 1917 Revolution, and the Civil War in Russia. By 
April 1916, McCully had served in Petrograd for one and half a year, was well 
acquainted with Russian affairs and won the reputation of the most experienced 
and informed member of the embassy staff. A former newspaperman Henry D. 
Baker became the first US commercial attaché in Russia. He served there from 
the end of 1914 and was active in promoting closer Russian-American relations 
in trade and commerce. Military attaché 2d Lt. E. Francis Riggs reached the post 
just recently and was officially presented to the Emperor on February 10 (23), 
1916. The last addition to the embassy staff was Captain James C. Breckinridge of 
the Marine Corps. He was assigned to duty as assistant naval attaché at Petrograd 
on February 16 and arrived there shortly before Francis’ arrival. All diplomats 
mentioned above accompanied the ambassador to the official Imperial reception 
which took place in the Aleksandrovskii Palace at Tsarskoe Selo on April 22 (May 
5), 1916.12 
Within a few months after the reception, almost the whole embassy staff 
was substituted. In May and June 1916 attaché Baker and all secretaries were 
reappointed to other posts. Harper also left Petrograd in August. Dearing, who was 
very critical of embassy’s work and elaborated plans “to revamp U.S. Embassy,” 
entered into conflict with Francis and in the fall of the year left Russia without a 
new appointment in the Foreign Service. In the course of 1916 secretaries Norman 
Armour, Sheldon Whitehouse, and Livingston Phelps joined the staff, followed by 
first secretary James G. Bailey in the early 1917. Of great help to Francis were 
the appointments of J. Butler Wright as counselor and William C. Huntington 
as commercial attaché later in 1916. The last imperial Russian foreign minister 
stated that Francis produced “an impression of not a diplomat, but a businessman, 
as well as all his embassy staff; even their residence was more like a commercial 
office than an embassy”. In his opinion, only Wright and Huntington looked 
like real diplomats. “Especially Huntington was able to serve as an example for 
foreign diplomats.”13 
Counselor Wright arrived at his post on November 4 (17), 1916, and found 
a staff beset with disorganization and inefficiency. Francis seemed “a rather daft, 
grandfatherly country gentlemen” with “great sense of nature, good keenness and 
common sense.” But as ambassador he had “very little conception of the social 
amenities as regards the Diplomatic Service.” As the weeks passed, Wright and 
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many of the embassy staff worried that the ambassador’s inexperience might 
cause him to do something foolhardy and embarrassing. As a result Wright and 
his colleagues hovered nervously around the ambassador, creating a tense work 
environment.14 “Wright performed his duties with great conscientiousness, but 
found it difficult to strike the right tone in his relation to Francis,” Kennan wrote, 
“In Wright’s eyes, Francis personified all the characteristic weakness of the 
political appointee in a diplomatic position. In Francis’ eyes, Wright manifested 
the worst traits of the career officer.”15 
After the First World War erupted the US embassy at Petrograd was assigned 
to represent the German and Austro-Hungarian interests in Russia. The main part 
of this job was supervision over a great number of prisoners of war. To coordinate 
the POW work the so called Second Division of the Embassy was created and a 
prominent social worker Edward T. Devine arrived in March 1916 to head it. The 
Division was assisted by the members of the American Young Men’s Christian 
Associations headed by Dr. Archibald C. Harte. Devine’s friction with Francis 
over their respective jurisdiction and his reputation of being pro-German led 
to his recall and in October the former secretary of the St. Petersburg embassy 
Basil Miles replaced him as head of the Division. “Mr. Basil Miles, the new head 
of the Second Division of the Relief Branch of the embassy, has taken charge 
and gives promise of being very satisfactory,” Francis wrote to his wife.16 Miles 
was appointed special assistant to the Ambassador with the rank of Minister 
Plenipotentiary. Soon the Foreign Service “emergency man” William F. Sands 
arrived in Petrograd as another special assistant to the Ambassador to help Miles 
in his division. On the whole, in the early 1917 at least 50 people made up the 
US embassy in Petrograd: 28 of the regular staff and 22 in the Second Division, 
making it the largest diplomatic mission in Russia.17 The staff of the US Consulate-
General at Petrograd consisted of five people headed by an experienced diplomat 
North Winship.18 
Most of the people named above was not mentioned in the Francis’ ego-centric 
memoirs or mentioned but scarcely. The ambassador constantly presents on the 
first plan in his self-centered memoirs. For example, Francis wrote practically 
nothing about the Second Division that carried out the main part of the embassy’s 
routine jobs. Meantime most of secretaries and attachés were more informed 
and experienced in their duties than the ambassador in his ones. Unfortunately, 
Francis’ “awkwardness made itself felt in the Ambassador’s relations with his 
career associates,—Kennan noted.—He could not help but be aware of their 
greater familiarity both with diplomatic life in general and with the Petrograd 
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scene in particular. On the other hand, it was difficult for him to seek and accept 
their opinions without betraying his own ignorance and forfeiting the dignity of 
his position.”19 “Apart from his ignoring the appearance of things in a capital rife 
with rumors about spying and espionage, Francis made additional mistakes due to 
the unfamiliarity of both setting and role,—another historian stated.—His outlook 
was shaped by the shibboleths around which he had fashioned careers in business 
and the Democratic party.”20
Arriving at Petrograd, Francis found that the state of the embassy building 
was a problem. The US Embassy rented the mansion of Count Michael N. Grabbe 
on Furshtatskaya street. The ambassador had his office on the second floor, near 
two small private rooms that Philip Jordan had furnished as his bedroom and 
sitting room. But this poorly furnished “palace” was considered a “laughing 
stock among Russians and diplomats alike,” chargé Charles S. Wilson reported.21 
Francis was appalled at the rundown condition and inadequate furnishing of the 
embassy that was described by an eyewitness as looking more like a warehouse 
than a residence. “It is a large house and susceptible of being made very attractive, 
but it is out of repair and has little furniture and no furnishing whatever,” the 
ambassador wrote to his son.22 “The Embassy building is in very poor condition. 
I am sleeping in the Embassy and taking breakfast here, which is furnished by 
the wife of one of the messengers; my luncheon and dinner I get elsewhere,” 
he reported to the Secretary of State.23 On May 17 (30) Francis cabled Lansing: 
“Just completed visits to my colleagues whose elegantly founded, well located 
embassies put me to shame. Am. Embassy inconvenient ill adapted almost 
absolutely unequipped.”24 Francis was obliged to advance his own cash to pay 
for a dining room suite, kitchen utensils and supplies, curtains, and shades.25 
From another side, the Francis residence was located “in a fashionable part of the 
city lying between its center and the Tauride district to the east. Since this latter 
district included the later Soviet headquarters at the Smolny Institute, as well as 
the Parliament building, the American Embassy found itself in the midst of some 
of the most dramatic and violent happenings of the revolutionary period.”26
Francis’ personal connections in the Russian capital were rather limited. As 
Kennan noted, “Francis’ taste and habits were the robust and simple ones of the 
American Middle West at the turn of the century. As such, they bore little affinity 
to the refined predilections of continental diplomatic society.” The “Governor’s 
preference for an evening’s entertainment ran to good cigars, good whisky, 
and a few cronies around the card table, rather than to large and elegant mixed 
gatherings. For this reasons, as well as by reason of a certain parsimoniousness, 
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he lived for the most part quietly in his Embassy apartment, confining his social 
life largely to the American colony, taking relatively little part in the social doings 
of high Petrograd society.”27 In April 1916 there were 202 American citizens in 
the Russian capital.28
Significantly, Francis first visitor after his arrival was H. Fessenden Meserve 
who represented the National City Bank of New York in Russia.29 A Missourian, 
Samuel McRoberts, vice president of the bank, also arrived in Petrograd on May 2 
(15), 1916, for the purpose of consummating a loan of $50,000,000 to the Russian 
government.30 Francis actively supported McRoberts during his visit to Petrograd 
and helped to negotiate a loan. At the very end of the year a branch of the National 
City Bank was opened at Petrograd. Another respected American businessman 
in the Russian capital was L. McAllister Smith of Guaranty Trust Company of 
New York. But the main figure in the local American business community was 
the representative of the New York Life Insurance Company Frederick M. Corse. 
“The tall, fifty-one-year-old Vermonter was fluent in Russian and considered to 
be the dean of the American colony in Petrograd. He was Francis’s closest male 
friend.”31 It was Corse who initiated the establishment of the American Hospital 
in Petrograd. In December 1916, Francis was personally introduced to each of the 
wounded soldiers at the hospital.32 Friction within the American community led to 
one faction separating to sponsor the American Refuge for Refugee Women and 
Children from the war zone. Its main backers were the Meserves and McAllister 
Smiths. Both factions received the additional support from the US embassy.
Another circle of the Francis’ acquaintances consisted of American wives of 
Russian noblemen with high social standing: Baroness Frances Ramsay who was a 
sister of Sheldon Whitehouse; Countess Lilie Nostitz; Princess Susan Beloselskaya-
Belozerskaya; Princess Julia Cantacuzéne-Speransky, granddaughter of President 
Grant. Assistant foreign minister Vladimir А. Artzimovich, a former consul at San-
Francisco, also was married to an American. He was America’s confidential friend 
in the ministry but was dismissed in October 1916. There was also the educational 
and philanthropic Mayak (Lighthouse) Society in Petrograd, sponsored by the 
YMCA and headed by General Secretary Franklin A. Gaylord. Pastor George 
A. Simons ran the affairs of the American Methodist Episcopal Chapel in 
Petrograd. In 1915 a branch of Russian-American Chamber of Commerce and the 
Society for Promoting Mutual Friendly Relations between Russia and America 
were established at Petrograd. The Society was headed by the former Russian 
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Ambassador to Washington Roman R. Rosen. In June 1916 the Society Council 
gave a dinner in honor of the new US Ambassador.33 Nevertheless Francis was 
slow to make friends among the Russians. “I gave a Fourth of July reception 
yesterday,” he wrote to his wife. “The guests were mainly, if not altogether, 
Americans, as Russians do not understand the Fourth of July, and furthermore I 
have made comparatively few social acquaintances among the Russians.”34
Francis’ circle of knowledgeable acquaintances, his place in the Russian high 
society, and his influence in governmental lobby were far smaller than that of 
the British or French ambassadors. Francis “had found himself overshadowed, 
in his relation to Russian court circles, by his French and British colleagues, 
who were more experienced, better connected, more at home in the world of 
dynamic diplomacy and aristocratic social forms.”35 The most influential foreign 
representative in Petrograd was obviously the British ambassador Sir George W. 
Buchanan. The stuffy and proper Englishman sharply contrasted with the casual 
Francis.36 Next in influence was the French ambassador Maurice Paléologue. His 
first meeting with the US ambassador went very poorly because Francis efforts 
to avoid giving the slightest hint of partiality in the war won the ire of the French 
ambassador37. “Francis seems to have found no easy approach to his diplomatic 
colleagues,”—Kennan noted.—“They, for their part, tended either to ignore him 
or to view him with amusement and condescension. His rare diplomatic dinners 
… failed to accord with the standards of diplomatic elegance then prevailing in 
the Russian capital.”38 Francis “was alternately ignored and patronized by his 
British and French colleagues. He seldom entertained and led an unsociable life 
in the dilapidated embassy.”39 Both Buchanan and Paléologue scarcely mentioned 
Francis in their memoirs and so Russian officials did. 
The whole term of Francis’ stay in Russia may be divided on five periods: 
last months of the Imperial Russia (April 1916–February 1917), revolutionary 
turmoil under the Provisional Government (February–October 1917), dawn of the 
Bolshevik era in Petrograd (October 1917–February 1918), stop-off in the Soviet 
Vologda (March–July 1918), and the final sojourn to Arkhangel’sk occupied by 
the Allied forces (August–November 1918). Actually, Francis saw five different 
Russias from his windows. He was made to act in five different historical situations 
and presented five different images of Russia in his book. That is why his Russia 
from the American Embassy appeared before the reader as many-faced, varied, 
and even contradictory.
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“The mission upon which I have started is a very difficult one”, Francis 
wrote after his appointment.40 But he was not able to realize then how difficult it 
would prove! His main assignment in Russia was to negotiate a new commercial 
treaty instead of the old 1832 treaty abrogated by the US government in 1911. 
Surprisingly for the instigators of the abrogation this sanction did not affect 
Russian policy at all. The abrogation had accomplished nothing. Meanwhile, 
Russian-American relations were frigid and the abrogation only added to existing 
difficulties.41 Woodrow Wilson himself actively supported the abrogation in search 
for votes at the eve of the 1912 election but becoming President he was forced 
to try to restore normal commercial relations with Russia. Ambassador Marye 
could not accomplish the task. And now, the military correspondent Richard 
W. Child wrote in 1916, we “need diplomatic and commercial representation in 
Russia of a standard of excellence which can eradicate a growing suspicion of our 
sordidness;” we “need the proper official representation also because at the end of 
the war we must strive to make a commercial treaty with Russia.”42
Interested primarily in negotiating a new commercial treaty, Francis accepted 
the post under the mistaken impression that he could accomplish this end without 
difficulty. But from the very beginning he was shockingly disappointed by 
Russian refusal even to discuss the matter. Instead Russian foreign minister Sergei 
D. Sazonov several times reminded Francis that “the treaty had been denounced 
by America and not by Russia.”43 With the treaty his primary interest, Francis 
was to find his stay in Russia marked by frustration, bitterness, and failure.44 
Actually, the main job of the US embassy in Russia during the First World War 
was the care of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war. Ambassador 
Marye complained that “operation of the embassy was swamped by the influx 
of unexpectedly high numbers of POWs; 80 percent of its work was devoted to 
this issue.”45 The POW work was greater than all other business of the embassy 
combined, Francis reported in July 1916.46 “At the end of 1916, the American 
Embassy and Consulates in Russia were undertaken to care for more than two 
million military and civilian prisoners in concentration camps scattered throughout 
European Russia and Siberia”, Countess Nostitz wrote.47 The necessity to fulfill 
these enormous obligations became an unpleasant surprise for Francis who had 
but a little interest in the job. “He would have preferred to ignore the military-
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prisoner issue and was dismayed by the scope of problems in what he called the 
‘uncongenial task’ of representing German and Austrian interests.”48 
Francis had one-sided view of internal situation in late Imperial Russia 
influenced by his acquaintances in liberal Russian circles. As Harper noted, 
the ambassador quickly had “interested himself in the work and views of the 
people’s organizations, whose leaders were soon to head the revolution of March, 
1917.”49 A prospect of revolution was first hinted by him as early as August 1916, 
when Francis reported to the Secretary of State: “I do not think there will be a 
revolution immediately after the close of the war,” but “if the Court Party does not 
adopt a more liberal policy by extending more privileges to the people and their 
representatives in the Duma, a revolution will take place before the lapse of even 
a few years.”50 “It is more than interesting to be in the position which I occupy at 
this time,”—Francis wrote in December 1916.—“This is the most critical period 
of the world’s history in my opinion, and Petrograd is occupying a very prominent 
place in the theater of affairs – in fact it is second to none.”51 Francis anticipated 
some events of importance in Russian history but was sure that “there is no danger 
of a revolution before the end of the war.”52 His own position began to strengthen 
due to the breaking off the diplomatic relations between the USA and Germany on 
February 3, 1917. “The Russians are very much pleased with the stand we have 
taken and are already beginning to treat us as Allies,” Francis reported.53 A bit 
later the ambassador repeated to Wilson, that he did “not anticipate any revolution 
… in the immediate future.”54
On February 23 (March 8), 1917, the revolution in Petrograd did erupt. 
According to Countess Nostitz, when its outcome had become clear Francis said 
to her: “It doesn’t surprise me. But all the same I consider my colleagues of some 
of the other Embassies have made a great mistake in backing up the opposition 
movement against the Imperial Family. I told them so at our last conference. I said 
—‘Gentlemen, in the Middle States, from where I come, we don’t swap horses 
while crossing a stream.’”55 Only after the Emperor’s abdication he recognized 
that “This is undoubtedly a revolution, but it is the best managed revolution that 
has ever taken place for its magnitude.”56 A downfall of thousand years Empire 
meant a dawn of the new era in Russia and in history of Russian-American 
relations as well as in the Francis’ diplomatic career.
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The US ambassador was the first foreign diplomat who posed the question of 
recognition of the Russian Provisional government. Three days after the Emperor 
abdication Francis telegraphed to Washington his reasons for speedy recognition 
trying to convince Lansing that it was “the most amazing revolution” which 
was “the practical realization of that principle of government which we have 
championed and advocated, I mean government by consent of the governed.”57 
To his mind the Russian revolution was the equivalent of the American one 
almost a century and a half before.58 His decision was influenced also by the new 
Russian foreign minister Pavel N. Milyukov who found in Francis “a credulous 
interlocutor.”59 Milyukov himself recalled: “The Ambassador from the United 
States, the dear Francis (who was in no way a diplomat), clearly wanted America 
to be the first to recognize the Russian revolution, and I willingly entered a little 
conspiracy with him.”60 As George Buchanan noted ironically, “The United States 
Ambassador was the first to recognize the Provisional Government officially on 
March 22, an achievement of which he was always proud.”61
But Francis was not able to follow the rapid and chaotic sweep of events that 
led Russia from one crisis to another. His view of unfolding events was limited 
and based on illusions. Francis confessed such “assumptions concerning the 
Russian situation” which “were least likely to be fulfilled,” namely, “that Russian 
political life would advance at once toward a stable parliamentary system and 
that Russia would continue to wage war.”62 “In the euphoria that followed the 
tsar’s abdication, Francis and other U.S. officials neglected the deeper social and 
economic origins of the revolution, underestimated the strength of the Soviet, and 
exaggerated the power of the Provisional Government. An inflated notion of the 
influence and authority of the Duma leaders distorted Francis’ perspective and 
alleviated his concern about the unpredictability of the workers and soldiers.”63 
He “never grasped the degree to which political authority had become fragmented 
or understood the army’s demoralization.” Besides, “Francis labored under the 
haziest knowledge of the ideological divisions within the Marxist and non-
Marxist socialist parties.”64 Francis “was sufficiently aware of the plight of the 
Russian people to welcome jubilantly the overthrow of the Tsar and the coming 
to power of the Provisional Government,” the former consul DeWitt C. Poole 
said. With “the members of the Provisional Government Francis had a bridge of 
understanding, and with them in power over a period of years Francis might have 
gone down as a pretty successful ambassador.” Those pro-Allied liberals, Poole 
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continued, “were well inside the understanding and liking of Francis or any other 
rather narrowly American American.”65 
On March 25 (April 7), 1917, news of the US entering the war against 
Germany reached Petrograd. This created new situation in Russian-American 
relations and made the US ambassador popular figure in the Russian capital. 
“That revolution and our entering the war, so nearly contemporaneous as they 
were, mark a new era in the history of society,” Francis reported. “Our form of 
government is their model; our taking part in the contest has infused into them a 
confident spirit and imbued them with a firm determination.”66 As Francis stated a 
bit later, “in my judgment the American Embassy is respected to a greater extent 
and has more influence with the Provisional Government and with the people 
generally than any other mission in Russia.”67 Owing to his position as envoy of 
Russia’s new powerful ally, Francis indeed enjoyed a rather elusive prestige in 
Petrograd. But his ambassadorial position was compromised and diminished by 
the flux of special US missions with no clearly defined responsibilities which one 
after another was arriving on the Petrograd scene during the summer of 1917. 
The first of them were the Railway or Stevens Commission and the so-called 
Root Mission. Francis readily supported the former and even tried to direct its 
activities but was reluctant as to the advisability of the latter which was sent by 
the Wilson administration regardless of the ambassador’s opinion. From the very 
beginning the question of confusion of authority arose. As Root remarked, “It 
is plain that we can’t have three bodies dealing with the Russian Government 
at the same time—the regular Embassy, the President’s Mission & the R.R. 
Commission.”68 But Wilson refused to define authority clearly. As a result, 
Stevens sometimes interfered to diplomatic matters, Root discussed railroad 
questions, and Francis tried to do everything maneuvering between two chiefs 
of missions and different branches of the Russian government. The Root Mission 
departed Petrograd on June 26 (July 9) leaving behind the US Military Mission 
which turned out to be one more quasi-political body representing special Army 
interests. It was headed by Br.-General William V. Judson. 
Probably, the most exotic was the American Red Cross Mission (ARCM) 
which soon arrived at Petrograd to add more embarrassments for the ambassador. 
The mission was promoted by a Montana copper magnate William B. Thompson 
who tried to use it as an instrument of America’s support of Russia’s continued 
participation in the war. Neither the ambassador nor other official representatives 
on the scene felt that there was a need for such a mission.69 The result was 
deplorable misunderstanding between the ARCM and the US embassy.70 One 
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more US agency was created by the Committee on Public Information (CPI) 
under the title the American Press Bureau at Petrograd. The CPI was represented 
by journalist Arthur Bullard and the Committee associate chairman Edgar Sisson 
who considered himself as “Special Representative of President Wilson in 
Russia.” “Thus the making of trouble and confusion were implanted firmly in the 
situation by official Washington before Sisson even arrived in Russia.”71 
After the CPI emissaries’ arrival, the situation with US official representation 
in Petrograd was confused to the highest degree. Petrograd was “host to high-
level U.S. commissions, delegations, and missions that collectively eclipsed the 
embassy’s significance.”72 Francis and “a number of other high-ranking State 
Department officials already at their posts in Russia did not look favorably at the 
prospect of the preemption of their responsibilities by the special commissions. 
The ambassador and his staff viewed the personnel of the various commissions as 
Johnnies-come-lately and as too inexperienced to understand either the political 
complications of the Revolution or the Russian military’s failures on the eastern 
front.”73 Bullard described the situation in the following words: “No one of the 
ambassadors was of strong enough character to dominate and control his own 
flock. Grouped, about each embassy, there were military missions, secret services, 
publicity agents, commercial attachés, all busily engaged in trying to serve their 
country, but with no one to co-ordinate their actions. They were continually 
getting in each other’s way.” And, he added. “Our own representatives—embassy, 
military mission, Red Cross, and consulates—were just as bitterly divided.”74 
At the same time the ambassador’s “neglect of discerning reports” by his 
more competent and informed subordinates “meant that Francis denied himself 
real familiarity with the Russian situation.”75 In the mid-September J. Butler 
Wright noted in his diary that amid rumors “that the ‘Bolshevik’ sentiment is 
growing in strength throughout the country everyone, with only the exception 
of D.R.F., believes that a clash—and a serious one—is bound to occur soon.” 
The counselor was amused by “the glowing reports of D.R.F.” which were not 
distinguished by brilliant insights or farsighted prescriptions.76 On the morning 
of October 26 (November 8), 1917, Francis once more woke up in a completely 
new country. “Situation here undetermined but this Bolshevik government can 
not survive and I think will collapse within few days,” Francis telegraphed to 
Washington on the fourth day of the October Revolution.77 The “ ‘Governor,’ 
as Harper and other advisers called Francis—and in character he remained the 
ex-governor of Missouri, the Show-Me state—was confident that the Bolsheviks 
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would not take power, and then, that they would fall.”78 With such a view the 
ambassador “seemed to have no policy at all except to insist that the Bolsheviks 
could not last.”79
Lt.-Colonel Raymond Robins, who replaced Thompson as the head of 
ARCM, and General Judson from the very beginning were in favor of some 
limited contacts with the Bolshevik government considering them as a matter of 
necessity. But Francis officially informed Judson on November 7 (20) that “it was 
my policy to do nothing or permit no act to be performed by anyone connected 
with the Embassy or under my control that could be construed as a direct or 
indirect recognition of what is generally known as the ‘Bolshevik’ government.”80 
The start of the Soviet-German peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk created a 
new situation. Judson insisted on contacts with the Soviet leadership in order to 
influence conditions of the armistice and Francis begun to be inclined to his opinion 
but on November 23 (December 6) Lansing forbade “all direct communication 
with the Bolsheviks.” Under pressure from opposite sides, a disoriented Francis 
acted contradictorily or preferred not to act at all. 
All the significant American representatives in Petrograd jointly agreed to 
recommend opening informal channels of communication with the Bolshevik 
government in order to coordinate actions against Germany. The American 
community was united on one other issue as well: the necessity of replacing 
the ambassador with someone more reliable and with better judgment.81 After 
Francis’ conviction was proved wrong by the Bolshevik seizure of power, the 
sense that the elderly ambassador was tired, confused, and out of touch with 
Russian reality contributed to a movement by other US envoys in Russia to 
have him recalled.82 Sisson, the prime instigator of the recall move, reported on 
November 21 (December 4): “Found Ambassador without policy except anger 
at Bolsheviks, unamenable to arguments or entreaties of his official advisers, 
military and civil.” In his opinion “no fruitful work can be done here by any 
division of our Government so long as Francis remains in charge of Embassy.” 
The ambassador “impress every one as a sick man absolutely unfitted to the strain 
physical and mental of his great post,” Sisson added.83 The next day Judson wrote 
in his diary that Francis “seems to me completely exhausted and overwrought 
by the strain he has recently been under.”84 Two days later Huntington reported 
to Harper that Francis was increasingly tired, despondent, and in ill health85. 
Bullard shared the common opinion in his letter to Edward House: “Francis is a 
sick man entirely overwhelmed by the situation,” and “he has created hopelessly 
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hostile relations with people where it is his obvious duty to seek cooperation.”86 
The recommendations for Francis’ removal were supported by Basil Miles and 
William F. Sands, who had already returned to Washington and tried pushed the 
decision through the State Department.87 
Sir George Buchanan left Petrograd on December 25, 1917 (January 7, 1918), 
and Francis, being the next in seniority, replaced him as a doyen of the diplomatic 
corps. His debut in this capacity took place a week later when Francis led the 
entire corps in its unanimous protest against the arrest of the Romanian minister 
Count Diamandy and all his staff by the Bolsheviks.88 Vladimir Lenin responded 
by pointing to the extremely dangerous situation in which Russian troops found 
themselves in the Romanian front. Nevertheless, the Romanians were released the 
following day and then deported from Russia. Significantly, unpublished version 
of the Francis’ memoirs differs in this particular case from the published one.89 In 
the course of further events Francis was becoming increasingly isolated—from 
Washington, the Soviet government, and his own staff.90 On February 7, 1918, 
Harper concluded that a new ambassador was needed because “men of wide vision 
and men of action are required at this most critical post.”91 At the same time, 
Robins was bound to appear in Petrograd as “the real American Ambassador” 
and thus to diminish Francis’ prestige and his potential usefulness in the formal 
ambassadorial position.92 
By the end of January the wife of the naval attaché at Petrograd came to 
a conclusion that there was “no place for Americans! There is nothing that 
they can accomplish.”93 The same day the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk 
interrupted peace negotiations giving a pretext for German offensive which begun 
on February 18, 1918, and created danger for Petrograd.94 Two days later at a 
conference of Allied representatives the decision had been made to abandon the 
Russian capital. While the Soviet government was preparing to escape to Moscow 
the Americans made a choice in favor of Vologda, a railroad junction 300 miles to 
86 McFadden, Alternative Paths, 92.
87 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 385-386.
88 See: FRUS 1918. Russia, I, 477-478; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 330-342. 
French version: Louis de Robien, The Diary of a Diplomat in Russia, 1917–1918 (N.Y. 
& Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 190-194. Romanian version: Flavius Solomon 
& Andrei Cuşco, “How Much Ideology can Diplomacy Endure? The Early Phase of 
Soviet-Romanian Relations, November 1917–February 1918,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas, N.F. 63, Heft 3 (2015): 400-407. Soviet version: Zalkind, I.A. “NKID v 
semnadtsatom godu,” in: Utro Strany Sovetov (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1988), 204.
89 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 338. 
90 Saul, War and Revolution, 222-224.
91 Ibid., 229.
92 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 395-396.
93 Pauline S. Crosley, Intimate Letters from Petrograd (New York: E.P. Dutton & 
Company, 1920), 273.
94 In between the change of calendars occurred. Until February 1918 Russia clung to 
the Julian (or Old Style) calendar, which was 13 days behind the Gregorian (New Style) 
calendar used in Western Europe and the United States. So February 1, O.S., turned into 
February 14, N.S.
Vladimir Noskov, David R. Francis, Ambassador 59
the east of Petrograd. There Francis might decide to continue his way further east 
until Vladivostok or to go to Arkhangel’sk in the Northern Russia. On February 
26 & 27 the American colony consisted of more than 60 people left Petrograd.95 It 
included the embassy staff, officers of the military mission, Red Cross and YMCA 
people, personnel of the New York City Bank, and some other Americans. Most of 
the other diplomatic missions followed the Americans or joined them later. Thus 
Vologda turned to be a “diplomatic capital of Russia”, as Francis termed the city.
“I went out from Petrograd to Vologda to see Mr. Francis early in March 
1918, ten days after all the embassies had fled from the panic-stricken capital,” 
the theatric critic Oliver M. Sayler wrote. “The day I arrived in Vologda, the 
Ambassador gave out to the Russian press the following statement, which was 
copied throughout Russia: … America still counts itself an ally of the Russian 
people and we shall be ready to help, no matter what Government organizes a 
vigorous resistance to the German invasion.” “Here again, with all its genuine 
sympathy, was the same misunderstanding of the social revolution as a mere 
political quarrel,”—concluded the author.—“Here again was the delusion in 
which most people outside Russia resisted—the delusion that Russia could fight 
once more if she wished to.”96
News of the Brest-Litovsk treaty concluding on March 3, 1918, quickly 
reached Vologda. Francis decided to “inveigh against Brest-Litovsk” hoping to 
destroy it especially after the Murmansk experiment where the Allies cooperated 
with the local Soviet in the joint efforts to organize anti-German front. On April 
5, Francis telegraphed to Lansing: “Transportation conditions deplorable and 
require improvement, which we can best render having demonstrated our ability 
thereof by bettering Soviet government service.” The ambassador even suggested 
“to place American Railway Commission in charge of Soviet government.” 
“Furthermore, in event of Allied intervention from east or west or both, railroad 
efficiency is essential,” he continued. Francis recommended to ignore “mistakes of 
Soviet government and outrages practiced” in order to “induce Soviet government 
to ask Allied assistance, so that when Allies enter Russia, will not with Soviet 
government’s refusal, but Soviet government’s welcome.”97 By May 2, Francis 
had decided that “time for Allied intervention has arrived” because the Russian 
people were ready to welcome it.98 On June 4, after the Czecho-Slovak revolt, 
he made a trip to Petrograd trying to establish contact with anti-Bolshevik forces 
in the former capital on the assumption that soon the Bolshevik power would 
collapse.99 In his opinion, the Czecho-Slovak case might justify the intervention 
of the Allied powers in Russia.100 “Russian people confidently expecting Allied 
intervention and will welcome it,” Francis stated. “Russian people are expecting 
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America to lead in intervention,” he continued. “At the same time these people 
require leadership and look to us therefore.”101 
During his stay in Vologda and later in Arkhangel’sk, Francis kept 
acquaintances with a lot of people prominent not only in local affairs but in all-
Russian politics as well. On July 4, 1918, he reported: “I gave a Fourth of July 
reception to-day.” The “feeling in Vologda is very friendly towards the Embassy 
as it is realized that we have added much to the reputation of the city.”102 But this 
idyll disappeared two days later when Left Socialist-Revolutionaries assassinated 
Count Mirbach, Germany’s envoy to Russia, and anti-Bolshevik uprising erupted 
in Moscow followed by a mutiny in Yaroslavl’. In response the Extraordinary 
Revolutionary Staff was created in Vologda. It assumed all powers in the city and 
stationed the military guard at the door of the embassy. The Soviet government 
tried to force the diplomats to remove to Moscow. Instead they decided to escape 
to Arkhangel’sk where the Allied intervention was anticipated.
On July 24, 1918, Francis at the head of the entire diplomatic corps left 
Vologda and reached Arkhangel’sk after the Allied forces occupied the city. Now 
Arkhangel’sk turned to be the second diplomatic capital of Russia alongside 
with Moscow. From Arkhangel’sk Francis “called for large, aggressive military 
campaigns to reorganize Russian resistance to Germany and eradicate the menace 
of Bolshevism.”103 “There Francis became enmeshed in the affairs of Nicholas 
Chaikovsky and the ant-Bolsheviks of the area, whose career involved coup, 
countercoup, and kidnappings.”104 He practiced direct and sometimes crucial 
personal intervention in the local politics acting more like a governor of Missouri 
than an ambassador. Francis even pressed (or “advised” “very categorically,” in 
his own words) the appointments of officials in the Northern Government. But by 
the fall of the year he depleted his own resources of energy and health. The timely 
arrival of Rear Admiral McCully, who was appointed commander of the American 
naval forces in North Russia, saved him. Placed aboard the USS Olympia on a 
stretcher, Francis left Arkhangel’sk for England on November 7, 1918. It was the 
first anniversary of the October Revolution and four days before the Armistice 
that ended the First World War. 
Francis spent the remaining eight years of his life trying to convince the 
American public that he was right, as he did in his testimony before the Overman 
Committee and in his memoirs.105 He published his Russia from the American 
Embassy soon after his official resignation in 1920. But the ambassador’s book 
“proved to be more a defense of his actions in Russia than a historical memoir.”106 
“His political role was not a great one, but his simple, outspoken, American 
pragmatism provided a revealing contrast to the intensely theoretical controversies 
101 Francis telegram, June 22, 1918, in: FRUS 1918. Russia, II, 220-223.
102 Francis telegram, July 4, 1918, in: FRUS 1918. Russia, I, 568.
103 David S. Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism. U.S. Intervention 
in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920 (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995), 295.
104 Mayers, The Ambassadors and America’s Soviet Policy, 83.
105 Allison, American Diplomats in Russia, 44-46.
106 Ibid., 47.
Vladimir Noskov, David R. Francis, Ambassador 61
that raged around him, and one comes away from the reading of his memoirs with 
the feeling that America could have been in some ways much worse served, if in 
other ways better,” Kennan noted.107 Russian historian Yurii Got’e stated in his 
review of Francis’ memoirs that documents cited by the author constitute the most 
valuable part of the book. But “Russia, Russian people, and Russian interrelations 
were not very comprehensible mystery for him.” Francis, in his opinion, was “a 
foreigner with, perhaps, the most alien psychology to us.” American ambassador 
was “not able to comprehend neither Russia itself, nor what is going on here.” 
Therefore his memoirs are “not an impartial account of events which took place 
in Russia in 1916–1918, but their reflection in the mind of businessman who to his 
own surprise become their eyewitness,” concluded the reviewer.108
David R. Francis died in 1927. Historians differ in their opinions of his legacy. 
Francis was the “most fascinating, controversial, and, perhaps, misunderstood 
American in Russia during the revolutionary years,” William Allison noted.109 
Consequently, to evaluate “Ambassador Francis is not easy task. Historians have 
called him incompetent, misplaced, and more recently, astute and dedicated. His 
character has generally been praised. His skill as a diplomat, however, has often 
been criticized.”110 “If, as was the case, he was poorly prepared in many ways 
for this unusual task, one cannot deny him a certain admiration for the spirit 
in which he accepted and performed it,” George F. Kennan wrote.111 But even 
his carefully balanced study “have not erased the negative portrait of David R. 
Francis as a nice old fellow who had no experience in diplomacy and was over 
his head representing the United States in revolutionary Russia.”112 According to 
Jamie H. Cockfield’s opinion, the “problem with his work came in his inability 
to comprehend and interpret events.”113 David Mayers stated categorically: 
“Mediocre U.S. diplomacy in St. Petersburg, broken by the accidental appearance 
of able envoys, culminated in the careers of Marye and Francis.”114 Only David S. 
Foglesong stays apart with his conclusion that “a careful review of the available 
evidence suggests the need to revise the common image of Ambassador Francis 
as a doddering, diplomatic dilettante.”115
As Kennan wrote many years ago, “It was easy for the members of the 
American community and the diplomatic corps to ridicule Francis and to deprecate 
his ability. An injustice had been done to him, and undeserved one, in sending him 
to such a post at such a time. Only the greatest unfamiliarity with the requirements 
of normal diplomatic life could have explained a belief that Francis at his age 
and with his experience and temperament, would have been well equipped to 
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meet those requirements.”116 This conclusion paves the way for considering the 
Francis problem as a part of the much broader Wilson problem. It was President 
Wilson who “thought that all people, whether they be Mexican peons or Russian 
peasants, whites or orientals, were capable of being trained in the habits of 
democracy.”117 “In both Mexico and Russia, finally, Wilson had started out fighting 
counter-revolution, and ended struggling to contain and control the very forces 
he had unknowingly encouraged by condemning reactionary special interests 
and imperialism.”118 “In wartime Russia,”—Christopher Lasch explained,—
“Wilsonians sought initially to buttress the pro-Allied liberal-nationalist regime 
of the March Revolution, in order to save the moral and material strength of a 
liberalized Russia for the anti-German coalition. Then too, even after failing to 
prevent the triumph of Russian Bolshevism, the Wilson Administration continued 
its limited efforts, by means of intervention and diplomacy, to end the single-party 
rule of the Bolsheviks and hopefully to bring Russia back to the lost liberalism of 
the March Revolution.”119 As David McFadden concluded, “Wilson’s policy was 
so torn between anti-Bolshevism and anti-intervention that it was not a Wilson 
policy at all, but instead a nonpolicy, often determined by subordinates, allies, or 
events in Russia.”120 
Francis’ diplomatic career is a particular case of Wilsonianism with its liberal 
illusions and democratic prejudices. That is why Francis’ failure as a diplomat 
may be considered as a display of Woodrow Wilson’s greater diplomatic fiasco 
which culminated in the Senate refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty. Francis was 
an ordinary American politician with a rather narrow provincial outlook. Finding 
himself in Petrograd he wished to see in Russia as another America. But Russia 
is a world in itself, and a foreign embassy is not the best point for observation. 
History itself, with the magnitude of events, was against Francis. Nevertheless he 
was not the worst of the US ambassadors in Russia. Francis was not, of course, 
the right man in the right place, but obviously he deserves sympathy and his 
memoirs—the closest attention. 
116 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, 40.
117 Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1957), 14.
118 Lloyd C. Gardner, Wilson and Revolutions, 1913–1921 (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott C°, 1976), 18.
119 Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (New York 
& London: Columbia University Press, 1962), 7.
120 David W. McFadden, “Did Wilson have a Russian Policy?” Reviews in American 
History 24 (1996): 628.
